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Letter to the Editor
Editor’s Note: The letter that follows was published in CCR 84 Spring 2021; however,
references cited by the author were dropped inexplicably. We regret the error and offer
the letter in its entirety.

The Pahlavis and the Other Side of the Coins
Ardavan Khoshnood
Lund University, Lund, Sweden
ardavan.khoshnood@med.lu.se
It was with great interest that I read “Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies” by János
Jany published in Comparative Civilizations Review (83, 2020: 67-102). Writing about
Iranian history is not an easy task because historical points of view have been highly
politicized. Such is particularly the case when discussing the Pahlavi dynasty,
particularly its founder, Reza Shah Pahlavi, and his successor, Mohammed Reza Shah
Pahlavi. It is therefore of major importance to be transparent and, when feasible, to
present the varying views and schools of thought which may exist with respect to the
Pahlavi dynasty (Khoshnood, 2019).
Jany’s article is one-sided — very biased — regarding certain points that I shall
endeavor to clarify by presenting the other side of the coins.
Point 1. As a result of Reza Shah’s pro-German policy during the 1930’s, British and
Soviet forces entered Iran in 1941, and the Shah abdicated in favor of his son (Jany
(2020): 76).
For purely political and ideological reasons, the opponents of Reza Shah and the Pahlavi
dynasty have attempted to attribute pro-Nazi sentiments and therefore pro-German
policies to Reza Shah. Such attributions could not be more mistaken. That Reza Shah
had pro-Nazi or pro-German tendencies is a myth. Based on matters related to national
interests, Iran had political and economic ties with the German government, just like
the ties which the Swedish government maintained with the Germans during World
War II (Åmark, 2015, pp. 350 and 353-355). Even though the reasons for the allied
occupation of Iran are complex, scholars have argued that the primary reason for the
occupation was to secure the Iranian railway in order to enable it to transport supplies
to the Soviet Army engaged, as it was, in its war against Nazi Germany, and to secure
the Iranian oil fields (Farrokh, 2011, p. 269).
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Regarding Iranian Jews, Reza Shah informed Adolf Hitler that these people were
Iranians and that any harm to them would be viewed as a direct offense to the Shah
himself. Hitler thus refrained from declaring Iranian Jews to be enemies of the Third
Reich (Ross, 2019). As a result of the Shah’s support, the Iranian Schindler, Abdol
Hossein Sardari, who was Iran´s consul in Paris during World War II, saved thousands
of Iranian Jews from certain death in German extermination camps (Mokhtari, 2012).
That Reza Shah was in no way pro-Nazi was also clearly demonstrated by the way he
modernized Iran and treated minorities. Orly Rahimiyan (2012) writes that “the Reza
Shah era witnessed the repeal of all of the discriminatory laws applying to Jews. Jews
were accorded the right to serve in the military and to enroll in state schools.”
Point 2. Mossadegh was finally removed from office in 1953 with the help of the CIA,
Operation: Ajax (Jany (2020): 76).
Although it is unfortunately and commonly believed among academics that the CIA,
through Operation Ajax, and MI6, through Operation Boot, removed Mossadegh from
office, the truth is far more complex. Many scholars either reject the view that the CIA
and MI6 contributed in any way to the fall of Mossadegh, or conclude that the roles of
the CIA and of MI6 were insignificant (Afkhami, 2009; Bayandor, 2010 and 2019;
Cooper, 2011 and 2019; Milani, 2009 and 2012; Mokhtari, 2008; Taheri, 2012; and
Takeyh, 2013 and 2014).
There is much more to the story than that of Operation Ajax and Operation Boot.
Point 3. The 1970’s witnessed an economic boom fueled by rising income from the oil
industry, and at the same time, controversies over land reform, which caused millions
of people to become unemployed, forcing them to settle in cities to look for jobs, more
often than not in vain (Jany (2020): 76).
Here, it is important to mention that the Iranian economy in 1977, just prior to the unrest
that contributed to the downfall of the Shah, was in an impressive state. Iran´s gross
domestic product (GDP) was 65 percent larger than that of Korea and 26 percent larger
than that of Turkey. Also, when examining GDP rankings, Iran, in 1977, was ranked
as the world´s 18th largest economy. Seventeen years earlier, it had ranked as the
world´s 19th largest economy (Chamlou, 2019).
In regard to unemployment rates, different sources present different rates. For this
reason, it is of utmost importance to consult primary sources. Dr. Jahangir Amouzegar
(1992), a prominent Iranian economist and former Minister of Finance and Minister of
Commerce in Iran, states in an article that “Most specifically, Iran's prerevolution
economy was far from stagnant: It was registering positive growth every year between
1963 and 1977, and unemployment was relatively small and localized.”
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A year earlier, Amouzegar (1991, p. 59), had stated that “All through the 1970s, even
to the very end, there was a shortage of labor in the country, as a whole, of both skilled
and unskilled workers. Open unemployment remained very low — at 1 percent of the
work force.” He added that “The unemployment rate consequently declined from 3
percent of the labor force in 1976 to 2.9 percent in 1977 […].”
It is thus not correct to write, as does Jany, that “millions of people” were unemployed.
Point 4. Since the army was not in full control of the situation, the Shah fled the country
the next year and made the way free for Khomeini to return (Jany (2020): 77).
Unfortunately, there is a massive lack of studies as to why the Imperial military failed
to gather behind the Shah and to bring order to the country. But to claim that the military
was not in full control is wrong. Regrettably, Jany’s article does not present any
information about this matter.
Many experts consider that the Islamic revolution was the unanticipated outcome of a
joint US-UK effort, encouraged by the West in general or made possible by it. The
why’s and how’s of these events are beyond the scope of this brief letter. I refer the
curious reader to various sources (e.g. Afkhami, 2009; Cooper, 2011; Evans, 2009;
Hanke, 1998; Nahavandi, 2005; Shawcross, 1981). To establish an authoritative basis
for my criticism, I refer here to Alexandre de Marenches, head of the French External
Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE), who informed the Shah that
the US president, Jimmy Carter, had determined to overthrow him and replace him with
someone else. De Marenches states that he “mentioned to the Shah the names of those
in the United States who had been given [the] responsibility of seeing to his departure
and replacement” and added that he also informed the Shah that he “had even taken part
in a meeting where one of the questions for consideration was, ‘How is the Shah’s
departure to be managed, and by whom shall he be replaced?’” (Ockrent, 1988, pp. 125126)
Even if one assumes that the US and the UK were behind the revolution, other
inferences can be made. These can be more clearly understood through the words of
the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, who in
an interview with Piers Morgan (2013) stated: “[…] We sent in an American general
[Huyser] …to tell the Iranian generals [to] back off. So for about 60 days we kept the
military from intervening in Iran. During that period, the revolution coalesced, the
military forces fell apart, extreme Islamists took over, and at that point the Carter
administration said, ‘oh my goodness, get the general to take control, don't let this
happen.’ And the general said, ‘we waited too long, we have no forces, and a few
months later all the generals had been shot,’ and we have Iran today.” In support of this
statement by General Clark, Jimmy Carter (1995, p. 457) states: “He [Huyser] had
dissuaded some of its [the military] leaders from attempting a coup”.
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It would thus, perhaps, be more correct to underline the passivity of the military with
respect to foreign interventions.
Point 5. Similarly, advocates of Western thought are believed to be or at least are
denounced as Western agents collaborating with foreign powers against Iran, a charge
with serious consequences. This reality helps one to understand why leaders of the
green opposition demanding more democracy and openness hastened to declare
publicly that they respect the underlying principle of the Iranian constitutional system,
velayat-e faqih, even though doing so undermines their own program, since this very
principle is the most important obstacle in the way of further democratization (Jany
(2020): 94).
This paragraph is highly problematic because of its political inferences. Jany states that
the leaders of the “green opposition,” its principal one being Mir-Hossein Mousavi, are
in reality opposed to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but that they are
forced by fear of persecution to state otherwise. This very political statement is not at
all representative of Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s political views.
Mousavi was not only a close assistant of Ruhollah Khomeini, but he was also the Prime
Minister of the Islamic Republic during one of its most difficult periods including an
ongoing war with Iraq. Mousavi was also involved in the 1988 massacres of political
prisoners which still haunt the regime (Khoshnood, 2020). To believe that Mousavi, as
the leader of the green movement, is in reality opposed to the constitution of the Islamic
Republic is very wrong. On the contrary, both Mousavi and other individuals in the
green movement, just as Jany states, have endorsed the constitution of the Islamic
republic. It is very unclear how Jany (2020) can claim to know what the leaders of the
green opposition really think. Based on their history as servants of the Islamic regime
in Iran and Mousavi´s role in the 1988 massacres, it is fully understandable that they
would not only respect but also support the constitution of the Islamic Republic.
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